Domestic and cross border spillover effects of corporate tax policy in Africa by Brun, Jean-François & Coulibaly, Seydou
 
 
 
C E N T R E  D ' É T U D E S  
E T  D E  R E C H E R C H E S  
S U R  L E  D E V E L O P P E M E N T  
I N T E R N A T I O N A L  
 
 
SÉRIE ÉTUDES ET DOCUMENTS 
 
 
Domestic and cross border spillover effects of corporate tax policy 
in Africa 
 
Jean-François Brun 
Seydou Coulibaly 
 
 
 
Études et Documents n° 17 
April 2019 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To cite this document: 
 
Brun J.-F., Coulibaly S. (2019) “Domestic and cross border spillover effects of corporate tax 
policy in Africa”, Études et Documents, n° 17, CERDI. 
 
 
CERDI  
PÔLE TERTIAIRE 
26 AVENUE LÉON BLUM 
F- 63000 CLERMONT FERRAND  
TEL. + 33 4 73 17 74 00  
FAX + 33 4 73 17 74 28 
http://cerdi.uca.fr/ 
Études et Documents n° 17, CERDI, 2019 
2 
The authors 
Jean-François Brun 
Assistant Professor, Université Clermont Auvergne, CNRS, IRD, CERDI, F-63000 Clermont-
Ferrand, France. 
Email address: j-francois.brun@uca.fr 
Seydou Coulibaly 
PhD Student in Economics, Université Clermont Auvergne, CNRS, IRD, CERDI, F-63000 
Clermont-Ferrand, France; African Development Bank, Abidjan,  Côte d’Ivoire. 
Email addresses: coulsay26@yahoo.fr; s.coulibaly@afdb.org 
Corresponding author: Seydou Coulibaly 
This work was supported by the LABEX IDGM+ (ANR-10-LABX-14-01) within the 
program “Investissements d’Avenir” operated by the French National Research Agency 
(ANR). 
Études et Documents are available online at: https://cerdi.uca.fr/etudes-et-documents/ 
Director of Publication: Grégoire Rota-Graziosi 
Editor: Catherine Araujo-Bonjean 
Publisher: Mariannick Cornec  
ISSN: 2114 - 7957 
Disclaimer: 
Études et Documents is a working papers series. Working Papers are not refereed, they constitute 
research in progress. Responsibility for the contents and opinions expressed in the working papers 
rests solely with the authors. Comments and suggestions are welcome and should be addressed to the 
authors. 
Études et Documents n° 17, CERDI, 2019 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
Abstract  
This paper examines spillover effects in corporate tax policy for African economies. Using a 
balanced panel data in statutory corporate income tax (CIT) rate for 34 African countries over 
the period 1995-2013, we find positive interaction between CIT rates in Africa only when 
common time trend effects are not controlled. We conclude that the evidence of pure 
corporate tax competition among African countries is weak. These countries' tendency to 
implement similar fiscal policies under the common intellectual assistance may explain the 
positive slope reaction between their CIT rates. Regarding corporate tax base spillovers, 
estimation results indicate that cuts in foreign countries’ average corporate tax rate reduce 
the host country’s corporate tax base. When the host country reacts to a one percentage point 
cut in foreign countries’ CIT rates by cutting its own CIT rate in the same proportion, this 
ultimately results in a net erosion of its corporate tax base by 0.4%. This represents a 2.3 % 
loss of corporate tax revenue. Moreover, we find strategic complement responses in 
corporate tax base policies suggesting that countries react to the uptake of measures that 
tend to reduce the corporate tax burden in other countries by also undertaking similar 
measures. 
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1. Introduction
For attracting foreign investments, countries may have strong incentives to engage in tax 
competition through the lowering of their corporate tax burden. From market economy 
perspective, competition is desirable as it could stimulate competitiveness. But, competition 
between countries for attracting foreign investments through special tax treatments could lead 
these countries to erode each other’s tax revenues and thereby reducing their capacities to 
finance development. Corporate income tax (CIT) competition has particularly important 
implications for African economies because of the significant role played by the corporate 
income tax in tax revenue collection in these countries. The fact that corporate tax competition 
is likely to put downwards pressure into a key revenue source, namely corporate tax revenue 
is worrisome and therefore needs a particular attention. However, it is argued that tax 
competition may improve the efficiency of the public sector in the management of government 
revenue (the “starve the beast” argument). In fact, since the governments know that CIT 
competition is exerting downward pressures on tax revenues, they will be motivated to 
efficiently use the limited public revenue to properly respond to the demand of citizens and 
electors. International tax competition will remain for long at the heart of international taxation 
issues. This will be exacerbated with growing international mobility of capitals suggesting that 
multinationals can use transfer prices and other tax avoidance techniques to shift their real 
investments and profits from high tax jurisdictions to low tax jurisdictions. But they can’t shift 
their real investments and profits out of our planet suggesting that coordination of tax rules 
among countries could somewhat mitigate tax competition related issues. To better understand 
this issue, it is important to analyze the cross-border impact of national corporate tax policies 
and how host governments react to changes in international corporate tax policies. 
For OECD countries, Devereux et al. (2008) explain the fall in corporate tax rate by corporate 
income tax (CIT) rate competition between these countries. Casette and Paty (2008) find the 
existence of tax interdependence within Western European countries. These authors also find 
tax interactions between Western and Eastern European countries. Recently, Chen et al. (2014) 
test and find the existence of CIT rate competition among South Asian countries. 
Except the paper of Klemm and Van Parys (2012), there is no study that has investigated on 
corporate tax rate interaction among African economies. However, the analysis of Klemm and 
Van Parys (2012) relies on uniform weight matrix to test interdependencies among African 
CIT rates whereas this connection matrix is usually used to test for the existence of common 
policy environment which steers tax rates in the same direction not for testing the existence of 
pure tax competition (Caldeira et al., 2015; Casette and Paty, 2008). Furthermore, these authors 
test corporate tax rate competition in Africa using a panel data including Latin America and 
Caribbean (LAC) countries. They capture African countries through the weighting matrix 
attributing the value 1 for economies belonging to Africa and 0 otherwise. This approach is 
likely to exacerbate the heterogeneity problems and one would wonder whether the results 
obtained for African economies are not driven by the presence of LAC countries in the panel. 
Furthermore, the sample which these authors used includes 22 African economies while our 
regressions are carried out on 34 African countries since it is better to include as much as 
possible a large number of countries for getting a robust and general conclusion regarding 
corporate tax rate interactions between African economies. Furthermore, the extension of the 
Études et Documents n° 17, CERDI, 2019
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sample size reduces the risk of conducting the analysis with mainly cooperative tax 
jurisdictions or non-cooperative fiscal jurisdictions. For instance, Tunisia and Seychelles which 
are often been under radar as tax havens (see Jones and Temouri, 2016) are not in the sample 
used by Klemm and Parys (2012) for their analysis of tax competition in Africa. 
Furthermore, Klemm and Van Parys (2012) have estimated two reaction functions to analyze 
strategic interactions in setting tax holidays and investments allowances. However, this 
approach does not capture the possibility for a country to react on changes in tax holidays in 
competing countries by changing its investments allowances rules while keeping unchanged 
its tax holidays and vice versa. Our study takes onboard this consideration by estimating 
interaction between the overall corporate tax base rather than interactions between each 
specific tax instrument which affects the corporate tax base. The present study therefore aims 
to advance the literature on tax competition through the analysis of the tax base effects of 
changes in foreign corporate tax rates and tax bases in Africa. In fact, tax competition could 
occur through interactions between tax bases on the one hand and between tax rates and tax 
bases of the competing tax jurisdictions on the other hand. To our knowledge, the first study 
that empirically tests the existence of tax competition by considering both strategic spillovers 
through interaction between tax rates and tax base on the one hand and between corporate tax 
bases among tax jurisdictions for African economies1. We emphasized that such spillovers have 
tax revenue implications for African countries. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 develops the econometric methodology 
used to test CIT rate competition in Africa. Section 3 presents the data and discusses the choice 
of the tax rate variable used as tax competition tool. The section 4 presents and analyses the 
results obtained from the estimation of tax rates reaction function. In section 5, we turn to the 
analysis of corporate tax base spillover effects in Africa and the section 6 concludes the study. 
2. Empirical analysis on the existence of CIT rate competition among African economies 
To achieve this study’s objective, we specify a Nash tax reaction function (Chen et al., 2014; 
Devereux et al., 2008; Klemm and Van Parys, 2012) in which country’s i CIT rate reacts to a 
change in its neighboring countries j CIT rates and a set of explanatory variables that are likely 
to affect its setting. Our empirical model is aligned with the model used in tax competition 
studies classified as “Second-Generation Direct Studies” by Leibrecht and Hochgatterer (2012) 
in their literature survey in tax competition. Second-generation direct studies use tax reaction 
functions for explicitly modeling strategic interaction in CIT rate settings between independent 
tax jurisdictions. There is strategic interaction when an action on the tax policy of country i for 
attracting capital influences country j capital stock. Consequently, country j may react by 
modifying its tax policy toward capital attractiveness suggesting that in addition to the domestic 
environment that govern tax policy setting, the optimal corporate tax rate choice of country i 
depends on country j’s corporate tax rate and vice versa (Franzese and Hays, 2009). More 
                                                          
1 Experts consider that corporate income tax bases interactions are more critical than corporate income tax rate 
interactions between tax jurisdictions. 
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specifically, cut in the CIT rate of country i would lead country j to also reduce its CIT rate 
(Devereux et al., 2008; Franzese and Hays, 2009). 
Nash games and Stackelberg games are the theoretical framework used to model strategic 
interactions in tax rate settings. Nash tax reaction functions type consider simultaneous tax 
setting strategies while Stackelberg tax reaction functions are founded on the idea that other 
countries (followers) react to a change in the tax rate setting of a “leader” tax jurisdiction 
(Altshuler and Goodspeed, 2002). 
Empirically, for modeling strategic interactions, Nash game framework included among the 
determinant of CIT rate in country i, (τit), the weighted average CIT rate of all countries in 
competition except i (Wτjt). The Stackelberg game framework included the ‘leader’s’ lagged 
tax rate, among the explanatory variables of the host country’s i CIT rate. The lagged tax rate 
is included to consider the fact that the Stackelberg leader is the first to modify its CIT rate in 
the tax competition game (Altshuler and Goodspeed, 2002). It should be noted that when the 
lagged tax rate for the host country i and the weighted average tax rate for the competing 
countries except the country i are simultaneously included among the set of explanatory 
variables of a tax reaction function, this result to an empirical model called ‘mixed Nash and 
Stackelberg models’). 
Algebraically, the empirical model used to test the existence of CIT rate competition between 
African countries is as follows: 𝜏𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌(𝑊𝜏𝑗𝑡) +  𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (1) 
Where 𝜏𝑖𝑡 is the statutory CIT rate in country i at the year t. 𝑊𝜏𝑗𝑡   corresponds to other 
countries’ CIT rates 𝜏𝑗𝑡  multiplied by the spatial weighting matrix W
2. 𝜌 , is the spatial 
autocorrelation coefficient. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 represents macroeconomic variables that are likely to affect CIT 
rate setting. These control variables include GDP per capita, trade openness, government 
consumption and population (Klemm and Van Parys, 2012). A government may lower the 
corporate tax burden while trying to maintain the tax revenues at a constant level to ensure the 
provision of public goods and services. Tax revenues is, therefore, a relevant control variable. 
 𝜇𝑖 is the country fixed effects to control for unobserved country heterogeneity, while 𝜆𝑡 is 
country specific time trend included to control for common shocks affecting African economies 
each year. 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the independent and identically distributed error term.  
 
Because countries may influence each other in setting CIT rate, 𝑊𝜏𝑗𝑡 is potentially endogenous 
in equation (1). If the endogeneity issue of the spatially lagged dependent variable is not 
addressed in the estimation of equation 1, it would lead to overestimate the interaction term 
𝜌.We use an instrumental variable (IV) technique to address this endogeneity issue. We 
included some controls to explain the host country’s CIT rate. This suggests that the same 
controls variables for abroad countries also impact the CIT rate in these countries (the 
endogenous variable). Accordingly, the impact of these variables on the host countries 
corporate tax rate will transit via the average CIT rate in foreign countries. In such setting, the 
control variables in other countries could be used as instrumental variables for the average CIT 
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rate in foreign countries. We therefore follow the literature on tax competition and use as 
instruments for the average CIT rate in foreign countries, the average weighted of the control 
variables excepted tax revenues3 in abroad countries (Chen et al., 2014; Devereux et al., 2008; 
Klemm and Van Parys, 2012; Overesch and Rincke, 2011). For each control variable xit, the 
weighted average for others countries is calculated as follows: ?̅?𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗 𝑥𝑗𝑡𝑗≠𝑖 , with 𝑤𝑖𝑗 the 
connection matrix4 between the control variable in hand in the host country i (xit) and in others 
countries ( xjt). 
Control variables  
In order to properly isolate the effect of tax competition on the host country’s CIT rate, we 
need to control for the effect of key drivers of changes in CIT rate. Following the literature on 
corporate tax competition among countries, we include as control variables: trade openness, 
GDP per capita, total population, government consumption (Chen et al, 2014; Devereux et al, 
2008; Hufe, 2014; Klemm and Van Parys, 2012). 
Trade openness 
Trade openness is employed as a proxy of economic openness to control for the impact of the 
exposure of the country to trade and competition for foreign capitals. We use imports, exports 
and GDP data from PWT9.0 to calculate trade openness as the sum of imports and exports in 
proportion of GDP. The relationship between trade openness and CIT rate is expected to be 
negative since preferences for international trade may put downwards pressure on CIT rates 
for stimulating the country’s competitiveness. Nonetheless, as trade liberalization policies 
often induce cuts in tariffs and thereby losses in trade taxes revenues (Baunsgraad and Keen, 
2010), Government may try to compensate for these losses in trade taxes by increasing 
corporate income tax revenue, through an increase in the CIT rate. To sum up, the impact of 
trade openness on CIT rate is a priori unknown. 
GDP per capita 
GDP per capita is used to measure the state level of development. An increase in the level of 
GDP per capita can be an attractive factor for foreign investors and therefore puts the 
government into strong position for increasing or maintaining unchanged its CIT rate. 
Moreover, countries with higher level of GDP per capita are more abler to construct 
infrastructures and set up other non-tax factors that are key drivers of FDI such that these 
countries do not need to cut their CIT rate for attracting FDI. However, if the higher level of 
GDP per capita is mainly driven by few sectors in the economy like in some natural resources 
and raw materials dependent African countries, the government can cut corporate tax rate for 
attempting to attract foreign investment in the less developed sectors in order to boost their 
contribution to the national income. These considerations make somewhat difficult the 
prediction of the nature of the relationship between GDP per capita and CIT rate. 
                                                          
3Because of missing observations in this variable, the weighted average tax revenue in the others countries 
cannot be computed. 
4 We multiply the control variable by the same weighting matrix used for the spatially lagged dependent 
variable. 
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Total population 
Total population is used as proxy of the size of the country for considering the fact that larger 
countries have less incentive to engage in tax competition since they are potentially the losers 
of cuts in CIT rates (IMF, 2014). Clearly, the increase of demand in public goods and services 
that follows a raise in the population size is likely to lead government to increase the corporate 
tax rate for responding to the growing demand for public goods and services. Moreover, 
governments of countries with large population size are in power position to insist on the level 
of CIT rate they judge acceptable to be applied to market seeking FDI (Durst, 2018). We 
therefore expect that CIT rate will be positively related to the population. 
Government consumption 
Government consumption expenditure is included to control for the effect of the government 
financing needs. The sign of the effect of government consumption expenditure on CIT rate is 
difficult to predict because government may satisfy its revenue needs by increasing taxes. 
However, with high demand for revenues, the government may choose to reduce CIT rate to 
attract tax base. 
 
Time fixed effects  
In econometric model, time dummies are usually included to control for shocks that affect all 
countries in each year. However, including time dummies in our specification is equivalent to 
include the average corporate tax rate of all countries (Klemm and Van Parys, 2012) 
Accordingly, the following equation would be estimated: CITit = ρWCITit + CITt +Xβ +ε, with 
CITit the corporate tax rate for country i at the year t; and WCITit the weighted average tax rate 
of all the other countries (except the host country i) in year t and CITt the average tax rate of 
all countries in year t. One cannot doubt on the fact that WCITit and CITt are highly correlate 
making therefore hard the identification of the true impact of each of these two variables. To 
circumvent this problem, the literature suggested using linear time trend instead of including 
time dummies (see Klemm Van Parys 2012; Devereux et al, 2008). We therefore include time 
trend to control for potential common trend followed by the African countries in corporate 
taxation. 
3. Data and Sample 
We extract statutory CIT rates data from the Tax Rate Database of the International Monetary 
Fund, Fiscal Affairs Department (IMF-FAD). Data on GDP per capita are directly collected 
from the World Development Indicators (WDI) database of the World Bank. Data on Trade 
openness (calculated as the sum of imports and exports in proportion of GDP), government 
consumption and population are taken from the database Penn World Table, version 9.0 
(PWT9.0) (Feenstra et al., 2015). Total tax revenue data are extracted from the Government 
Revenue Database of the International Conference on Taxation and Development-(ICTD-
GRD) (Prichard et al., 2014). Finally, we obtain a balanced panel data in CIT rate for 36 
Études et Documents n° 17, CERDI, 2019
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countries5 over the period 1995-20136. The construction of balanced panel data for CIT rate is 
motivated by the fact that an unbalanced panel would cause year to year variations of the main 
explanatory, namely the average of CIT rate variables in other countries because of a change 
in the sample composition. In order to make sure that all variability in the weighted average 
tax rate is the result of tax policy, not sample composition, we base the calculation of the 
weighted averages tax rate only on a fully balanced panel in terms of the tax rate variables. 
Descriptive statistics on all the variables are displayed in table 1 below. The average CIT rate 
in Africa is 33.4% with a minimum rate of 15% and a maximum rate of 60% (the maximum 
tax rate is observed in Sudan). 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
CIT rate 646 33.404 6.650 15 60 
PIT rate 477 35.716 10.884 10 78 
CIT base 332 11.245 13.623 .0124 102.025 
GDP per capita 646 2384.448 2633.004 168.931 13160.21 
Agriculture value added 628 21.270 13.218 1.954 57.723 
Trade openness 646 78.584 37.590 14.772 225.043 
Natural resources rents 629 13.776 16.008 .002 77.054 
Inflation 646 62.518 980.179 -18.222 24411.03 
FDI net inflows 646 4.138 5.795 -8.589 43.329 
Government consumption 646 17.694 14.514 .634 109.008 
Source: Author’s calculations from IMF-FAD, ICTD-GRD, PWT9.0 and WDI. 
3.1 The relevant tax rate competition instrument 
The statutory corporate tax rate (STR), the effective average corporate tax rate (EATR) and the 
effective marginal corporate tax rate (EMTR) are three potential candidates for being tax 
competition tool. The effective average corporate tax rate proxied by the ratio of corporate tax 
revenues to GDP is not a perfect measure because it is affected by all the factors that influence 
the GDP and therefore some factors outside the control of the government (Devereux et al., 
2008). 
For African economies, the required data (interest rate, allowances rules) to calculate EMTR, 
the tax rate applied to marginal investment, are quite difficult to collect over long periods. 
Alternatively, our choice falls on the STR. The STR is a highly visible and simple indicator 
comparable across countries of a corporate income tax structure (Keen and Mansour, 2010), 
and it reflects the intent of decisions makers (Chen et al., 2014). Moreover, the STR is most 
relevant for profits shifting behaviors across tax jurisdictions (Keen and Mansour, 2010). 
Furthermore, because of the high correlation between statutory CIT rate, effective rates and 
special regimes (IMF, 2014, Keen and Mansour, 2010), we believe that our approach is 
acceptable and suitable for the purpose of the present study. 
                                                          
5 The list of countries is given in appendix. 
6 According to the experts, this period corresponds to the time when most of the corporate tax rate changes took 
place in Africa. 
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In figure 1, we present time series for the corporate income tax rate in the sample of African 
countries under investigation over the period 1995-2013. Figure 1 shows a tendency towards 
lower corporate income tax rates in Africa. Overall, the average corporate income tax rate 
declined from 38. 4% in 1995 to 29.1% in 2013.  
 
Figure 1: Trends in statutory corporate income tax rates 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from IMF-FAD. 
 
3.2 The choice of the spatial weighting matrix 
We discuss in this paragraph the choice of the connectivity matrix for exploring CIT rate 
interaction between countries. 
The contiguity matrix could be used as the spatial weighting matrix. The elements of the 
contiguity matrix are equals to 1 if the two spatial units share a common border and 0 otherwise. 
However, we do not use contiguity matrix as the spatial weighting matrix in our analysis for 
several reasons. First, with contiguity matrix, islands would have no neighbors. Second, 
because our dataset is not complete some countries may have no neighbors. Furthermore, 
basically, tax competition for attracting foreign investments is not restricted between first-order 
neighbors suggesting that contiguity matrix is not the appropriate weighting matrix to test for 
CIT rate interactions between tax jurisdictions (Klemm and Van Parys, 2012). 
Previous studies on tax competition use geographic distance weighting matrix (Chen et al., 
2014; Klemm and Van Parys, 2012; Overesch and Rincke, 2011) and economic distance 
weighting scheme. The rationale behind the use of geographic distance weighting matrix is 
related to the fact that geographically close countries are more relevant tax competitors since 
productive capitals are highly mobile between geographically close countries due to the relative 
lower cost of transport and information. This is in line with the first law of geography: 
“Everything is related to everything else, but near things are more related than distant things” 
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(Tobler, 1970: 236) explaining the wide use of geographical inverse distance in spatial 
econometrics for measuring connectivity. 
Algebraically, after standardisation, the weights wi j  of the geographic distance weighting 
matrix are given as follows: 
 𝑤𝑖𝑗 = {
1/𝑑𝑖𝑗
∑ 1/𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑗
 , 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗
0,                                              𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 = 𝑗
 
With 𝑑𝑖𝑗 the Euclidian distance between the capital of country i and country j for  𝑖 ≠ 𝑗. 
The economic distance weight matrix (Devereux et al., 2008; Casette and Paty, 2008) is used 
to reflect the idea that countries with the same economic patterns are more likely to engage in 
competition with each other for attracting corporate tax bases. After standardisation, the 
weights wij of economic distance weighting matrix defined as the inverse of the difference 
between GDP per capita of country i (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑖) and country j (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑗) are given as follows: 
 
𝑤𝑖𝑗 = {
(|𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑖 − 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑗|)
−1
∑ (|𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑖 − 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑗|)−1𝑗
 , 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗
0,                                              𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 = 𝑗
 
 
In contrast to most previous studies, ours’ considers a spatial weight matrix that combines both 
geographic and economic distance. The underlining idea is the fact that tax competition can 
take place between both geographically and economically close countries (Martinez-Vasquez 
and Liu, 2014). Following Martinez-Vasquez and Liu (2014), the elements wi j of this mixed 
weight matrix are computed as follows: 
 
 
𝑤𝑖𝑗 = {
𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑑𝑖𝑗
∑ 𝑒𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 𝑑𝑖𝑗
 , 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗
0,                           𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 = 𝑗
 
 
Where ei j is the inverse of the absolute value of the difference in GDP per capita between 
countries i and j; di j is the inverse of the Euclidian distance between the capital cities of 
countries i and j. For robustness check, we separately use each of the weighting matrices ei j 
and di j. Accordingly, to our knowledge, this is the first study that tests for tax competition using 
geographic or/and economic neighborhood matrices. 
 
4. CIT rate interactions in Africa: Baseline results 
Tables 2 and 3 presents the results obtained from IV estimation of equation (1). First step 
regressions from the instrumental variables estimations are reported in table 2 below. The 
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results show that all the instrumental variables we retained7 for each regression are significantly 
correlated to the endogenous variable (table 2), suggesting that the set of instrumental variables 
are not weak instruments. 
 
Table 2: Instrumental variable estimation of CIT rate interactions in Africa: first step 
regressions 
W(CIT rate) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Weighting schemes Benchmark 
weights 
Benchmark 
weights 
Inverse  
distance 
Inverse  
distance 
GDP 
 weights 
GDP 
 weights 
W(Gov. consumption)8 0.419*** 0.426***    0.523*** 
 (0.058) (0.056)    (0.059) 
W(Trade openness) -0.12*** -0.082*** -0.097***  -0.06** -0.126*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.008)  (0.027) (0.016) 
W(Population) -0.622*** -0.249*** -0.807*** -0.018** -1.098*** -0.113 
 (0.046) (0.071) (0.037) (0.007) (0.115) (0.081) 
GDP per capita  -0.001*** -0.003 -0.004*** -0.002** -0.004 -0.001** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Trade openness -0.009* -0.004 -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.012* -0.01 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.006) (0.005) 
Gov. consumption -0.020 -0.012 -0.031*** 0.001 -0.036 -0.011 
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.009) (0.007) (0.030) (0.026) 
Population -0.008 0.029 -0.010 -0.005 -0.001 0.012 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.011) (0.008) (0.034) (0.030) 
Tax revenue -0.011 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.008 0.035 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.009) (0.007) (0.029) (0.024) 
Time trend  -0.331***  -0.608***  -0.340*** 
  (0.049)  (0.017)  (0.057) 
W(GDP per capita)   0.001** 0.003*** 0.002*  
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)  
Constant 51.984*** 41.322*** 58.080*** 35.559*** 59.033*** 40.438*** 
 (1.287) (2.008) (0.425) (0.833) (1.325) (2.321) 
Observations 594 594 594 594 594 594 
R-squared 0.785 0.801 0.945 0.968 0.686 0.782 
Number of countries 34 34 34 34 34 34 
F-stat 252.3 247.4 1199 2088 151.2 219.8 
       
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Regarding the diagnostic tests, as reported in the bottom of the results table 3, the Anderson’s 
test of under-identification, the Cragg-Donald’s test of weak identification and the Sargan test 
of overidentification indicate that the set of instruments applied in each regression are relevant 
and exogenous. In fact, for all the specification, the Cragg Donald statistic is higher than the 
Stock Yogo weak identification test critical value at 5% (16.85). The null hypothesis of weak 
identification is therefore rejected, suggesting that the instruments used are not weakly 
correlated to CIT rate in competing countries. In other words, the set of instrumental variables 
                                                          
7 For each regression, in the set of potential instrumental variables, we keep only those that significantly affect 
the endogenous variable in the first step regression to avoid the problem of weak instruments 
8 In this paper, W( ….) is the average weighted of the variables in parenthesis in the foreign countries. Thus, W( 
CIT rate) therefore represents the weighted average CIT rate for the foreign countries.  
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used are not weak instruments. The Anderson canonical correlation test rejects the null 
hypothesis of under-identification since the p-value associated to this test is null in all the 
specifications. This latter result suggests that the instrumental variables are correlated to the 
endogenous variable (CIT rate in competing countries) and therefore these instruments are 
relevant. Finally, the Sargan test does not reject the null hypothesis of absence of correlation 
between the instrumental variable and the error term indicating that the instruments are valid 
instruments. 
In the results tables, the type of matrix of connectivity used in the regression is indicated at the 
head of columns. The label "inverse distance" indicated inverse geographic distance between 
countries is used as weights while "GDP weights" indicate that differences in GDP per capita 
between countries are used as weights. The label "Benchmark weights" indicates the weighting 
matrix combining economic (GDP per capita) and geographic distances (distance between 
capitals) as in Martinez Vasquez and Liu (2014). 
The baseline results show that, using combined geographical and economic distance weighting 
scheme, the neighbors’ average CIT rate [W(CIT rate)] positively affects the host country’s 
CIT rate suggesting the existence of strategic interaction (strategic complementarity) in CIT 
rate between tax jurisdictions in Africa (Table 3, column 1). This result is consistent with the 
findings of Klemm and Van Parys (2012). Typically, one percentage point decrease in the 
statutory CIT rates of other countries causes, on average, a cut of 0.72 percentage points in the 
host country’s corporate tax rate in response. However, when we control for time trend to 
control for correlated effects, that is, characteristics that the countries have in common, making 
them behave similarly (Jacobs et al., 2009), this impact is no longer statistically significant, 
and its magnitude remarkably decreases (table 3, column 2). These results are robust to the use 
of alternative weighting matrices; the geographic distance weight (table 3, columns 3 and 4) 
and economic distance weight (table 3, columns 5 and 6). 
Regarding the control variables, GDP per capita has always positive and significant impact on 
CIT rate although the amplitude of the impact is relatively small (0.001) indicating that African 
countries with highest GDP per capita tend to set higher corporate tax rate. In all the 
specification, the impact of trade openness on CIT rate is negative and statistically significant 
at 5%. This result suggests that international trade considerations play a role in the downwards 
trend in CIT rate in Africa. The estimated parameter for government consumption is positive 
and significant at 1% in all the specifications suggesting that on average higher public spending 
exert upwards pressure on CIT rate in the countries under investigation. However, in contrast 
to the predictions, we find that as the size of the population increases, CIT rate decreases. Since 
higher population implies in some extent higher demand for jobs, we speculate that this result 
could be explained by the fact that government may cut CIT rate for supporting the 
competitiveness of firms and their capacity to hire more people. In fact, policy makers may 
consider CIT rate cuts as stimuli for reducing unemployment rate which tend to grow with the 
population size. Finally, the impact of tax revenue on CIT rate is negative in all the 
specifications, but it is not statistically significant at the conventional significance levels. This 
result suggests that the level of tax revenue in Africa does not provide support to cuts in CIT 
rate.  
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Table 3: CIT rate interactions in Africa: baseline results. 
CIT rate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Weighting schemes Benchmark 
weights 
Benchmark 
weights 
Inverse distance  Inverse  
distance 
GDP per  
capita weights 
GDP per 
 capita weights 
W(CIT rate) 0.726*** 0.216 0.935*** 0.119 0.833*** 0.214 
 (0.085) (0.224) (0.099) (0.675) (0.092) (0.151) 
GDP per capita 0.001* 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Trade openness -0.036*** -0.034*** -0.031*** -0.035*** -0.029** -0.034*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) 
Gov. consumption 0.190*** 0.190*** 0.190*** 0.189*** 0.192*** 0.190*** 
 (0.053) (0.051) (0.052) (0.051) (0.054) (0.051) 
Population -0.168*** -0.115** -0.0954 -0.110* -0.104* -0.113** 
 (0.058) (0.057) (0.060) (0.058) (0.062) (0.057) 
Tax revenues -0.075 -0.066 -0.079 -0.069 -0.076 -0.070 
 (0.050) (0.049) (0.050) (0.050) (0.052) (0.049) 
Time trend  -0.361***  -0.424  -0.357*** 
  (0.139)  (0.359)  (0.104) 
Time trend No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 594 594 594 594 594 594 
R-squared 0.373 0.418 0.392 0.414 0.340 0.421 
Number of countries 34 34 34 34 34 34 
F(p) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Anderson(p) 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CD (stat) 237.636 34.890 963.123 51.187 123.642 87.546 
Sargan 0.171 0.905 0.634 0.752 0.412 0.830 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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It is possible that it has a delay in the response of other countries to changes in a host country 
tax rate (Heinemann et al, 2010), we test the robustness of our main finding by including one-
year lag of the average weighted CIT rate in neighboring countries. Results reported in table 4 
below clearly show that our results remain qualitatively unchanged to a delay in a host country’s 
reaction to modification in others CIT rate. These findings provide signals that the positive 
slope obtained from the estimation of tax rate reaction function between African economies 
may be due to common trend affecting these countries rather than a purely corporate tax rate 
competition among these economies. Positive interaction over CIT rate among African 
economies could be attributable to the implementation of similar tax policies (reduction of tax 
rates and broadening of tax bases) under the same technical assistance from technical and 
financial partners (IMF, World Bank, AfDB and UE) by these countries. 
Table 4: Allowing for a delay in host country's reaction to change in other countries CIT 
rate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
We continue the robustness analysis of the main findings by analyzing the role of personal 
income tax rate in a context of CIT rate competition. In fact, downwards pressure on CIT rate 
in the framework of tax competition may encourage individuals from incorporating themselves 
to escape tax on their earnings. We take onboard this consideration by including the top 
statutory personal income tax rate (PIT rate) among the set of control variables in the tax 
reaction equation (equation 1). Data on PIT rate are obtained from the IMF-FAD tax rate 
  (1) (2) 
CIT rate Benchmark 
weights 
Benchmark 
weights 
L.WCIT_rate 0.728*** 
(0.088) 
0.189 
(0.232) 
GDP per capita 0.001** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
Trade openness -0.039*** 
(0.012) 
-0.036*** 
(0.011) 
Gov. consumption 0.185*** 
(0.055) 
0.180*** 
(0.053) 
Population -0.140** 
(0.061) 
-0.0846 
 (0.061) 
Tax revenues -0.088* 
 (0.051) 
-0.074 
 (0.049) 
Time trend 
 
-0.394*** 
(0.148) 
Time trend No Yes 
Observations 562 562 
R-squared 0.359 0.404 
Number of 
countries 
34 34 
F(p) 0 0 
Anderson(p) 0 0 
CD(stat) 207.803 29.677 
Sargan(p) 0.224 0.939 
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Indicators database. The regressions use the so-called benchmark weighting matrix, the 
combined geographic and economic inverse distance weighting matrix for the average weighted 
tax rate in competing countries. As usual, the control variables for competing countries are used 
as instruments. The inclusion of personal income tax rate among the explanatory variables does 
not change our main results. There is no longer positive interdependence in CIT rates when we 
control for common effects (table 5, columns 2). The personal income tax rate has a positive 
impact on CIT rate corroborating the theoretical prediction that personal income tax rate act as 
a backstop for corporate income tax rate for limiting tax avoidance behaviors (table 5, columns 
1 and 2). 
Furthermore, we also test whether our results remain unchanged to the use of FDI inflows 
weighting scheme. Since after all, one of the main purposes of tax competition is to attract and 
retain FDI, it is plausible that competition really occurs between the top recipient countries of 
FDI in the continent. More practically, competition will tend to be worse between countries that 
attract similar levels of FDI. We therefore take on board this aspect by using as weight matrix 
the inverse of the difference of FDI net inflows between countries. FDI net inflows data are 
taken from the WDI database, the World Bank. As reported in table 5 (columns 3 and 4), the 
main findings of this study are robust to the use of FDI net inflows distance as weighting matrix. 
The control for the effect of common factors renders insignificant the coefficient of the 
weighted average CIT rate for competing economies. 
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Table 5: CIT rate interactions in Africa: Controlling for the impact of PIT rate and 
using FDI weighting scheme. 
CIT rate (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Weighting matrix Benchmark 
weights  
Benchmark 
weights 
FDI weights FDI weights 
WCIT_rate 0.607*** -0.136 0.819*** 0.447 
 (0.126) (0.436) (0.108) (0.369) 
PIT rate 0.113*** 0.112***   
 (0.032) (0.033)   
GDP per capita 0.001 0.001 0.002*** 0.001*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Trade openness -0.065*** -0.069*** -0.043*** -0.040*** 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.012) (0.012) 
Gov. consumption 0.255*** 0.229*** 0.189*** 0.187*** 
 (0.066) (0.068) (0.0557) (0.0534) 
Population -0.136* -0.048 -0.170*** -0.142** 
 (0.078) (0.085) (0.060) (0.063) 
Tax revenue 0.029 0.012 -0.099* -0.084 
 (0.061) (0.063) (0.052) (0.052) 
Time trend  -0.513*  -0.216 
  (0.266)  (0.212) 
Observations 423 423 576 576 
R-squared 0.428 0.414 0.314 0.371 
Number of countries 32 32 33 33 
F(p) 0 0 0 0 
Anderson(p) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CD (stat) 120.8 11.18 118.7 12.80 
Sargan (p) 0.546 0.707 0.136 0.138 
Standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Because it may take time to change corporate income tax regime due to adjustments costs for 
the private sector and resistance from some interest groups which think themselves as potential 
losers from the reform, there might be inertia in corporate tax policy in African countries 
(Klemm and Van Parys, 2012; Overesch and Rincke, 2011). We check the robustness of our 
finding to potential inertia in corporate tax rate. To do so, we simply include in the baseline 
empirical model specification (equation 1) a one-period lagged dependent variable among the 
explanatory variable. This leads us to estimate a dynamic spatial lag model. The estimation of 
this model raises two endogeneity problems. First, it is well known that in dynamic panel data 
models, the lagged dependent variable is endogenous due to its correlation with the individual 
fixed effects in the error term. In such conditions, estimating the model with fixed effect 
estimators will produce downward biased estimates (Nickell bias). The second endogeneity 
problem is related to the spatial lagged dependent variables because of interaction between CIT 
rates. In fact, in setting its corporate tax policy, the host country may be influenced by other 
countries CIT rate and reciprocally the host country corporate tax policy could also influence 
the corporate tax setting abroad. In such circumstances, ordinary least squares (OLS) estimators 
are not consistent for estimating this model. 
To overcome these endogeneity problems and obtained unbiased estimates, we rely on the 
system GMM estimator developed by Blundell and Bond (1998) for estimating dynamic panel 
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data model. System GMM estimator is performing well for panel data with large N and small 
T. Moreover, Kukenova and Monteiro (2009) demonstrates that system GMM are consistent in 
estimating the coefficient of the spatial lag dependent variable in dynamic spatial lag models 
with large N and T fixed. Our dataset T=19 and N=34 is not properly fitting with this setting 
because the time length T=19 could not be considered as small. We therefore decide to divide 
the time span of our dataset in three-years non-overlapping intervals to obtain three-year panel 
data except the last sub-period which is four-year panel data (1995/1997=1 1998/2000=2 
2001/2003=3 2004/2006=4 2007/2009=5 2010/2013=6). 
In system GMM estimator, the variables in levels are instrumented by their lagged differences, 
and the differenced variables are instrumented by the lagged variables in levels leading to 
increase the efficiency of system GMM estimator. If we agree that the control variables (GDP 
per capita, trade openness, government consumption, population and tax revenues) included in 
the equation 1 affect the host country’s corporate tax rate, it is also obvious that these variables 
for all the countries except the host countries also affect their corporate income tax rate 
suggesting that they can be used to instrument the average weighted corporate tax rate in 
equation 1. We therefore increase the set of instrumental variables by including the explanatory 
variables in other countries as external instruments for the weighted average corporate tax 
variable of other countries. To construct these instrumental variables, we use geographic inverse 
distance, economic distance (the difference in GDP per capita between countries i and j) 
weighting matrices and the combined geographic and economic distance matrix (benchmark 
matrix) used in the calculation of the spatially lagged dependent variable (average weighted 
CIT rate in foreign countries). Kukenova (2008), Foucault et al. (2008) and Klemm and Van 
Parys (2012) adopt the same approach for obtaining a set of instrumental variables to instrument 
the spatial lagged dependent variable for the system GMM estimations in their respective 
studies. 
The system GMM estimator has the advantage to deal both with the endogeneity issue of the 
period lagged dependent variable and the other control variables that are potentially 
endogenous. This feature is interesting in our case as a control variable like trade openness may 
be endogenous because of reverse causality from trade openness to corporate tax policy. Indeed, 
trade liberalization policies for promoting competitiveness and trade may put downward 
pressures on corporate tax rates. Reciprocally, changes in corporate tax policy by affecting 
competitiveness may affect trade. We have therefore considered all the control variables as 
potentially endogenous except the total population for which the reverse causality with 
corporate tax rate is less evident. 
The validity of the instrumental variables used in system GMM estimation is checked with the 
Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions and the Arellano and Bond’s autocorrelation tests. 
The Hansen J test of over-identifying restrictions tests the hypothesis of no correlation between 
the instrumental variables and the residuals. The Arellano and Bond’s autocorrelation tests 
determine whether there is first-order serial correlation in the error term [AR (1)] and no second-
order autocorrelation in the residuals [AR (2).] 
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We also paid attention to the problem of instrument proliferation in system GMM estimations 
by collapsing the set of instrumental variables. To avoid the “instruments proliferation” or “too 
many instruments” problem, the total number of instruments should not exceed the number of 
countries used in the regression (Roodman, 2009). 
Table 6 reports the results of estimating the dynamic specification of equation (1), using in turn 
the three different weighting matrices that have been discussed at the paragraph on the choice 
of weighting matrices above. The columns (1) and (2) use geographic distance weighted rates; 
columns (3) and (4) GDP-weighted rates; and columns (5) and (6) combined geographic and 
GDP distance weighted rates. Except the second regression (column 2, table 6) for which the 
number of instrumental variables (36) is slightly higher than the number of countries (34), all 
the regressions pass all the standard diagnostic tests. There is no evidence of second-order 
residual autocorrelation, and the Hansen test confirms that the set of instrumental variables are 
exogenous (see bottom lines in table 6 after the line for the number of observations, in the 
appendix). In addition, for each system GMM regression carried out, the number of instruments 
does not exceed the number of countries. The main findings remain unchanged, whenever we 
control for the effect of common time trend, the impact of the weighted average CIT rate on the 
host’ country CIT rate is no longer significant (columns 3 and 4, table 6). The estimated 
coefficient for the lagged dependent variable is positive and statistically significant at 1% in all 
the specifications thereby corroborating the prediction of path dependence in CIT rate for 
African economies. 
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Table 6 CIT rate interactions in Africa: Control for inertia in corporate income tax rate. 
Dependent 
variable: CIT rate 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Weighting matrix Inverse 
distance 
Inverse 
distance 
GDP 
weights 
GDP 
weights 
Benchmark 
weights 
Benchmark 
weights 
       
L. (CIT rate) 0.893*** 0.891*** 0.938*** 0.987*** 0.874*** 0.969*** 
 (0.036) (0.027) (0.040) (0.038) (0.038) (0.061) 
W (CIT rate) 0.108*** 0.107 0.029 0.255 0.071 0.113 
 (0.018) (0.075) (0.068) (0.176) (0.072) (0.209) 
GDP per capita 0.002*** 0.001* 0.004 0.003 0.002** 0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Trade openness 0.005 -0.001 -0.018 0.001 -0.030** -0.037** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.015) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) 
Gov 
consumption 
0.035 0.043* -0.067 -0.091** -0.024 -0.047 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.040) (0.044) (0.034) (0.050) 
Population 0.004 0.002 0.000 0.005 -0.014 -0.016 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) 
Tax revenue -0.054*** -0.054*** 0.115* 0.026 0.044** 0.049 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.063) (0.052) (0.020) (0.030) 
Time trend  0.043  0.585*  0.306 
  (0.122)  (0.321)  (0.378) 
       
Observations 165 165 165 165 165 165 
Nb. of countries 34 34 34 34 34 34 
Hansen, pvalue 0.260 0.265 0.241 0.210 0.140 0.388 
Instruments 33 36 22 27 25 21 
ar2, pvalue 0.720 0.721 0.790 0.726 0.761 0.750 
ar1, pvalue 0.011 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.011 
Robust Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In all the regressions, when time trend effect is controlled for, the positive interaction coefficient 
between CIT rates becomes statistically insignificant at the conventional significance levels. 
We interpret this result as an indication that the positive interdependence in CIT rate may be 
due to common conditions (correlated effects, intellectual trend). To comfort this explanation, 
we rerun the regressions using an approach extensively used in the literature to test whether the 
tax interactions are common trends and not a pure tax competition (Manski, 1993). The uniform 
weight matrix is commonly used to test the common intellectual trend in fiscal competition 
literature (Cassette and Paty, 2008; Caldeira et al., 2015). The weights of the uniform matrix is 
given by wij=1/(n-1) with n the number of countries. Results indicate that we cannot reject 
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Manski’s (1993) hypothesis of a common intellectual trend that drives countries’ fiscal choices 
in the same directions in the absence of strategic behaviors in the countries. Specifically, with 
uniform weights, we find that the average tax rate in foreign countries positively affect the host 
country’s CIT rate even if the effect of time trend is controlled (table 7, columns 1 and 2). This 
latter result supports the idea that CIT interdependences among African economies are govern 
by common intellectual trend that steers fiscal choices in the same direction rather than tax 
competition consideration. In fact, African economies face the same policy advise environment 
under the guidance of multinational institutions like the IMF, the World Bank and the AfDB 
which often suggest similar fiscal policy orientations to African countries. 
 
Table 7 CIT rate interaction in Africa: Testing the hypothesis of common intellectual 
trend. 
Dependent variable: CIT 
rate 
(1) (2) 
Weighting matrix Uniform weights Uniform weights 
   
L.CIT_rate 0.9128*** 0.9541*** 
 (0.0284) (0.0236) 
W(CITrate) 0.1061*** 0.3890*** 
 (0.0354) (0.0936) 
GDP per capita 0.0009*** 0.0003 
 (0.0001) (0.0002) 
Trade openness  -0.0269*** -0.0092 
 (0.0067) (0.0060) 
Gov. consumption 0.0959*** -0.0117*** 
 (0.0171) (0.0031) 
Population 0.0158** -0.0105** 
 (0.0060) (0.0040) 
Tax revenue 0.0210 -0.0594** 
 (0.0221) (0.0222) 
Time trend  0.193*** 
  (0.056) 
Observations 545 545 
Number of countries 33 33 
Instruments 32 32 
Hansen, pvalue 0.660 0.510 
ar1(p) 0.015 0.014 
ar2(p) 0.333 0.483 
Robust Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
5 Empirical evidence on CIT base effects in Africa 
So far, this study focused on corporate tax rates interaction among African economies. 
However, rather than using tax rates, national tax jurisdictions can use tax rules and tax 
instruments affecting the corporate tax burden to compete among each other’s for attracting and 
keeping foreign capitals. In fact, beyond the tax rate, foreign investors may take into 
consideration tax rules such as depreciation rules, tax holidays to choose among countries the 
location of their investments. Accordingly, countries may compete via the tax base instead of 
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the tax rate. After analyzing corporate income tax rate interactions, we turn to the analysis of 
corporate income tax base interactions among African national tax jurisdictions9 
5.1 Specification 
Tax competition has two properties namely strategic complementarity and base spillover (Rota 
Graziosi, 2018). By strategic complementarity, countries react to a decrease in one country’s 
CIT rate by decreasing their own CIT rate. By base spillover, change in one country’s CIT rate 
affect other countries corporate tax bases. We have tested the existence of strategic 
complementarity among CIT rate in Africa in the previous section. In this section, we turn to 
the analysis of the existence of CIT base spillovers among African economies. To do so, we 
borrow the IMF’s empirical model specification (mixed Nash-Stackelberg tax game model) for 
testing the presence of base spillover among countries (IMF, 2014). The model is specified as 
follows: 
𝑩𝒊𝒕 = 𝜹𝑩𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝝉𝒊𝒕 + 𝝆𝑾−𝒊𝒕𝝉𝒊𝒕 + 𝜸𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝒊 + 𝝁𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 (2) 
With 𝐵𝑖𝑡 the corporate tax base in country i in year t. the corporate tax base is proxied by 
dividing corporate income tax revenue in proportion of GDP by the standard corporate tax rate 
(IMF, 2014; Keen and Mansour, 2010). 𝐵𝑖𝑡−1 is the one-period lagged value of the corporate 
tax base. This variable is included to control for the inertia in tax base since it may take time to 
observe significant change in corporate tax base following a change in corporate tax rate 
because of adjustments costs. Technically, since there is inertia in CIT rate (Klemm and Van 
Parys, 2012; Overesch and Rincke, 2011) and dynamics in tax collection (Gnangnon and Brun, 
2017; Gupta, 2007; Leuthold, 1991), a priori, there is no reason to cast doubt on the inertia of 
corporate tax base proxied as the ratio of CIT revenue to the CIT rate. 𝜏𝑖𝑡 is the home country’s 
CIT rate in percent. 𝑊−𝑖𝑡𝜏𝑖𝑡 represents the average weighted corporate tax rate in abroad 
countries. 𝛼𝑖 and 𝜇𝑡 respectively represent country and time-specific effects. 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the usual 
error term. 
Xit is a vector of control variables that are likely to affect the corporate tax base. The variables 
include the GDP per capita, trade openness (sum of imports and exports in proportion of GDP), 
agriculture value added (in % GDP), inflation (changes in consumer price index) and natural 
resources rents (in %GDP). The GDP per capita is included to control for the effect of 
development level on corporate tax base while trade openness controls for the effect of 
international trade on corporate tax base. We include Agriculture value added to control for the 
sectoral composition of the economy on corporate tax base. We consider the effect of 
macroeconomic policies on corporate tax base by controlling for inflation. Natural resources 
rents are included to control for the role of the country’s endowment in natural resources in size 
of the corporate tax base. IMF (2014) does not include a measure of natural resource wealth 
among the control variable in their specification for analyzing corporate tax base spillovers in 
                                                          
9 Experts argue that the corporate tax bases interactions tend to be are more important than corporate tax rate 
interactions. This is reasonable, since given inertia in tax rate, countries may have strong incentive to use tax 
instruments, which affect tax liabilities' of corporations, other than tax rate  to compete among themselves. 
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developing countries whereas natural resources are an important component of corporate tax 
base in these countries. 
As high-income countries tend to attract more businesses, we expected that GDP per capita will 
positively affect the corporate tax base in our estimations. For promoting international trade, 
government can relax taxes on imports and grant tax incentives for firms whose activities are 
exported-oriented. From this perspective, trade openness may negatively affect corporate tax 
base in Africa. The agriculture sector is still under informality and dominated by subsistence 
agriculture. We therefore anticipated negative association between agriculture value added and 
corporate tax base. Inflation increase operating costs and reduces profits, thereby corporate tax 
base. Natural resources exploitation stimulates businesses and transactions. We therefore 
predict positive impact of natural resources on corporate tax base. Data on GDP per capita, 
Agriculture valued added, Inflation and natural resources rents have been extracted from the 
database WDI, the World Bank. Data on Corporate income tax revenue in percentage of GDP 
are taken from the IMF-FAD Tax Revenue Indicators database. 
Figure 2 shows the evolution of CIT revenue in proportion of GDP between 1995 and 2013 for 
Africa. While CIT rates have dropped in Africa from 1995 to 2013, CIT revenue in percentage 
of GDP have almost doubled (from around 2%GDP in 1995 to 4% GDP in 2009) excepted for 
the sub-period from the global recession of 2009 to 2013 where the declining of CIT rates is 
associated with decrease in CIT revenues. This rate-revenue paradox of corporate taxes could 
be explained by improvement in corporate tax administration and enforcement, corporate tax 
broadening (as shown in figure 2), improvement in business climate which in turn increases 
corporate profitability and corporatization (see Abbas and Klemm, 2013; Keen and Mansour, 
2010). 
 
Figure 2: CIT revenue, CIT base and CIT rates in Africa 
 
Source: Author’s construction from IMF-FAD. 
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5.2 Choice of the weighting matrix 
In this section, we are exploring whether corporate tax rates abroad affect corporate tax base of 
a host country for African economies. In other terms, we are testing the existence of base 
spillovers effects in corporate taxation in Africa. Such effects mainly operate through two 
channels: investments decisions and profit shifting. Indeed, with capital mobility across 
countries, investors have strong incentive to reallocate their investments (assets) in countries 
with lower tax burden for ensuring a higher after-tax return on the investments. As discussed in 
the previous section above, countries with the same economic characteristics are most likely to 
compete each over through corporate tax policy as they offer similar business environment to 
investors. An advanced economy will be more sensible to changes in corporate tax policy of 
another advanced economy than for a small economy. Accordingly, the GDP per capita is a 
relevant candidate as a weighting matrix for the average tax rates abroad in equation 2. 
Practically, we use as weighting matrix the inverse of the absolute difference between the 
countries GDP per capita, such that the intensity of base spillovers effect will tend to be stronger 
for countries which have close development levels. 
The effect of change in corporate tax rates abroad on domestic corporate tax base operate 
through profit shifting behaviours. Even if profit shifting behaviour is somewhat difficult to 
observe directly (Qian et al, 2017), one cannot cast doubt on the fact that it is highly motivated 
and fueled by the corporate tax rates differential between the host country and other countries 
abroad. Since profits shifting attitudes do not depend on macroeconomics or social factors but 
rather mainly depend on tax burden differential across tax jurisdiction, we use unweighted 
average tax rate in other countries to take into account profits shifting and base erosion 
consideration in corporate tax spillovers in Africa (IMF, 2014). 
The dynamic nature of our model renders fixed effects estimators inappropriate for estimating 
it because of the correlation between unobserved fixed effects and the lagged dependent 
variable. In addition, because reforms affecting a host country corporate tax base could cause 
change in corporate tax policy abroad, the average corporate tax rate variable abroad is 
potentially endogenous in equation 2. The endogeneity problems of the lagged dependent 
variable and the average corporate tax rate abroad are addressed using the system GMM 
estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1998). Here again, to comply with the system GMM setting 
(large N and small T), we subdivide the time span of our dataset in three-year non-overlapping 
intervals. We obtain three-year panel data except the last sub-period which is four-year panel 
data (1995/1997=1 1998/2000=2 2001/2003=3 2004/2006=4 2007/2009=5 2010/2013=6). 
5.3 Corporate income tax base effects in Africa: Estimation results 
Table 8 displays results from the estimation of model (2) with system GMM estimator (two- 
step) using GDP weight and uniform weight for the average tax rate in other countries. The 
estimation results10 pass all the standards validity tests. The Hansen test does not reject the null 
hypothesis of absence of correlation between the instruments and the error term. There is no 
second order serial correlation in residuals as indicated by the p-value of the autocorrelation 
                                                          
10 The number of countries used in the regressions has declined because of missing values in corporate tax base 
due to missing values for the corporate tax income revenue data. 
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test and the estimation do not suffer from instruments proliferation problem. The variables tax 
base and GDP per capita are taken in logs while the other variables are in levels. 
Results show that an increase in the host country’s tax rate will deteriorate its corporate tax base 
(table 8, column 2). The effect of one percentage point increase in the host country’s CIT rate 
will decrease its corporate tax base by 4. 6%. Regarding the spillovers effects, results suggest 
that reduction in the foreign corporate tax rate is likely to reduce the host country’s corporate 
tax base. This effect is mainly significant for uniform weight (table 8, column 2) suggesting 
that corporate tax base erosion is Africa is operating through profit shifting activities. Typically, 
one percentage point reduction in the foreign countries’ average corporate tax rate is likely to 
reduce the host country corporate tax base by 4.21% (table 8, column 2). However, if the host 
country reacts to one percentage point cut in foreign countries CIT rate by cutting by one 
percentage point its own CIT rate, this will increase the host country’s CIT base by 4.6%, 
leaving a net corporate tax base loss of 0.4%. In terms of corporate tax revenue, our calculations 
indicate that, on average, these tax base losses represent 2.3 percent for the economies used in 
the econometric estimation11. As expected, the level if development and natural resources 
wealth contribute to broaden the corporate tax base. Inflation has negative impact on corporate 
tax base as predicted. In contrast to predictions, results show that agriculture value added, and 
trade openness positively affect corporate tax base in Africa. Results show that the estimated 
coefficient for the lagged value of the corporate tax base is positive and statistically significant 
at 1% (table 8, columns 1 and 2). This result corroborates the prediction of inertia in corporate 
tax base and therefore suggests that countries that manage to broaden its corporate tax base 
today are more likely to have large corporate tax base tomorrow.  
                                                          
11 The economies include Algeria, Angola,Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Camerron, Congo republic, Cabo Verde, 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Morocco, Madagascar, Mali, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Senegal , Swaziland, 
Seychelles, Togo, Tunisia, Tanzania, Uganda, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe,  
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Table 8: Impact of the average corporate tax rate of foreign countries on the corporate 
tax base of a host country. 
Dependent variable: log(CIT_base) (1) (2) 
Weighting schemes GDP  
weights 
Uniform 
weights 
   
Lagged dependent variable, t-1 0.719*** 0.578*** 
 (0.126) (0.077) 
CIT_rate 0.004 -0.042*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) 
W(CIT_rate) 0.013* 0.046*** 
 
 
(0.007) (0.003) 
Log (GDP per capita) 0.187 0.187** 
 (0.206) (0.081) 
Trade openness 0.002 0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.000) 
Agriculture value added 0.016 0.012* 
 (0.020) (0.006) 
Inflation -0.020** -0.016*** 
 (0.008) (0.004) 
Natural resources rents 0.018*** 0.020*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Observations 90 90 
Number of countries 27 27 
Hansen, pvalue 0.487 0.600 
Number of instruments 27 22 
ar2, p 0.709 0.753 
ar1, p 0.058 0.057 
Robust Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
5.4 Further analysis  
Corporate tax base spillovers analysis could not be limited to the assessment of the effect of 
foreign countries corporate tax rate on domestic corporate tax base. Spillovers effect may arise 
from changes (tax holidays, depreciation allowances rules) which affect the foreign countries 
corporate tax base while maintaining the CIT rate unchanged. In fact, an action on foreign 
countries corporate tax base could affect the host country’s corporate tax base. We evaluate the 
impact of change in foreign countries’ corporate tax base on the host country corporate tax base. 
To take into account this consideration, we included among the explanatory variables in model 
(2), the foreign countries corporate tax base (𝑊−𝑖𝑡𝐵𝑖𝑡). We obtain the following specification: 
 𝑩𝒊𝒕 = 𝜹𝑩𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝝉𝒊𝒕 + 𝝆𝑾−𝒊𝒕𝝉𝒊𝒕 + 𝜽𝑾−𝒊𝒕𝑩𝒊𝒕 + 𝜸𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝒊 + 𝝁𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 (3) 
The average weighted corporate tax base abroad can be computed on balanced data in corporate 
tax base. Since corporate tax base are calculated by dividing corporate income tax revenue to 
the statutory corporate income tax rate, missing values in corporate tax revenue systematically 
translate into missing values for the corporate tax base data. We therefore manage to get as 
possible few missing values for the corporate tax base. For this purpose, we fulfill missing data 
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on corporate tax revenue taken from IMF-FAD by corporate tax revenue data extracted from 
the International Conference for Taxation and Development Government Revenue Dataset 
(ICTD-GRD) where available12. This enables to have in the regressions 24 countries out of 34 
countries for which we have balanced data on CIT rates. 
Table 9 presents estimation results from the estimation of equation (3) by system GMM 
estimator using GDP and uniform weighting schemes. We find that with the GDP per capita 
weights, the impact of foreign countries tax base on the host country’s corporate tax base is 
positive but not statistically significant (column 1, table 9) whereas this impact is positive and 
significant with the uniform weights (column 2, table 9) indicating strategic responses in 
corporate tax base policies. These results are indicating that the negative effect of tax incentives 
provision in foreign countries on the host country’s corporate tax base is occurring through 
profit shifting but not through relocation of real asset investments. 
Table 9: Effect of changes in abroad countries’ CIT base and CIT rate on the host 
country’s CIT base. 
Dependent variable : CIT base (1) (2) 
Weighting schemes GDP weight Uniform weight 
   
L.CIT base 0.953*** 0.924*** 
 (0.034) (0.054) 
CIT rate -0.123* 0.002 
 (0.061) (0.170) 
WCIT_rate 0.282** 0.267 
 (0.130) (0.374) 
WCIT_base 0.778 0.663** 
 (0.491) (0.299) 
GDP per capita -0.001* 0.0004 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Trade openness -0.055** -0.010 
 (0.025) (0.008) 
Agriculture value added -0.445*** -0.081* 
 (0.102) (0.046) 
Inflation -0.001* -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Natural resources rents 0.174** 0.147 
 (0.069) (0.087) 
Observations 117 117 
Number of countries 24 24 
Hansen, pvalue 0.814 0.489 
Instruments 20 20 
ar 2, pvalue 0.450 0.365 
ar1, pvalue 0.033 0.098 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
                                                          
12 Before doing so, we have compared the data on corporate tax revenue for the two datasets for the periods 
where data are available for both of them. We remarked few differences between these two data, there are even 
equal for certain years. 
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6 Conclusion 
Globalization gives incentives to countries to compete against each other to attract foreign 
capitals through cuts in CIT rates and provision of tax incentives. This study analyzed in which 
extent African countries set CIT rate in response to each other. The paper also examines 
corporate tax base spillovers between African economies. We do not find strong evidence of 
CIT rate competition between African economies. More precisely, we found strategic 
interaction in CIT rate only if we do not control for the effects of time trend. We therefore 
conclude that positive slope of the tax rate reaction function between African economies may 
be attributable to the same tax policy environment within which these economies evolve, under 
the technical assistance from the same technical and financial partners. rather than a pure CIT 
rate competition between these economies. With respect to base spillovers, the findings from 
this study that cut in the average tax rates abroad reduce the host country’s corporate tax base. 
If the host country reacts to cut in foreign countries tax rates but cutting in own CIT rate in the 
same proportion, this will ultimately result in a net loss of corporate tax base in proportion of 
GDP of 0.4% and corporate tax revenue in proportion of GDP of 2.3% for the host country. 
Moreover, we find strategic responses in corporate tax base policies suggesting that countries 
react to tax incentives in other countries by also offering tax incentives. The strategic responses 
mainly operate through profit shifting but not through relocation of real asset investments. From 
policy implications perspective, these latter results suggest limiting corporate tax cuts and tax 
incentive for preventing corporate tax base erosion and profits shifting in Africa. 
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Appendix 
 
List of countries: Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Burkina faso, Comoros, Congo, Cabo verde, 
Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
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